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Improving Future Policy Responses 
to Foreseeable Bank Risk-Taking
Joao F. Gomes, Marco Grotteria, Jessica A. Wachter
In the years after the financial crisis of 2007–2008 and the subsequent recession, 
several empirical studies (including our own) found that collapses in economic 
activity tend to occur in the aftermath of large credit expansions.1  
These credit expansions—marked by significant 
increases in “riskier lending” by banks to consequently 
over-indebted households—are supposedly driven 
by competitive pressures to lend, and can be exac-
erbated by perverse incentives or behavioral biases.2 
These findings have led some to argue that large credit 
expansions in and of themselves are a key cause of 
severe economic downturns. However, this common 
narrative misinterprets the role that lending plays in 
the business cycle. In our research, there is no validity 
to the concept of a credit cycle “causing” the business 
cycle.3 Despite the novelty of some of the mechanisms 
that developed in the run-up to the Great Reces-
sion—for example, the collateralizing of subprime 
mortgages and the unregulated use of derivatives—it, 
like all recessions, was the result of cyclical variations 
in economic conditions.
The propensity of banks to engage in riskier lend-
ing over the business cycle can therefore be understood 
simply as an informed response to outside macroeco-
nomic forces and the impact those forces have on the 
most important factor driving bank decision-making: 
the bank’s franchise value. Banks benefit from eco-
nomic rents, and bank franchise value is essentially 
the (discounted) value of the entire future stream of 
SUMMARY
• This brief offers new perspectives on the behavior of banks 
during the financial crisis of 2007-08 and the limited success 
of unconventional monetary policies in stimulating bank credit 
to the private sector during the subsequent economic recovery.
• The common narrative about the financial crisis is that it was 
caused by a large credit expansion with overly risky loan-
granting behavior by banks. We argue, however, that banks 
actually made optimal financial decisions in the lead-up to 
the crisis, based on their calculation of their franchise value.
• The brief explains the mechanics of franchise value—how it 
led banks to shift their portfolios toward riskier household loans 
before the crisis, as well as how it dampened the impact of 
quantitative easing and other novel monetary policies meant 
to stimulate the investment of capital into the private sector.
• Policymakers have failed to recognize the role that franchise 
value plays in all bank decisions. If they wish to devise ap-
propriate fiscal or monetary policies to prevent or mitigate a 
future crisis, they need to properly account for how franchise 
value drives the decision-making of bank managers.
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these rents. Rent values fluctuate over 
time as local and aggregate economic 
conditions change, and they are the 
result of the spread between banks’ 
return on assets and their cost of debt. 
Although, in practice, rents can arise 
simply from a lack of competition 
in the banking sector, our research 
focuses on rents derived from explicit 
government guarantees on bank 
deposits (i.e., FDIC deposit insur-
ance). Deposit insurance serves as a 
form of subsidized financing for banks 
that lowers the cost of their debt 
and raises the rents they collect and, 
thereby, their franchise value. 
The key to this alternative inter-
pretation of bank risk-taking is 
understanding that the fluctuations 
of a bank’s franchise value over the 
business cycle is what motivates all 
lending behavior—the good and the 
bad. Rather than suffering from irra-
tional exuberance in the years before 
the autumn of 2008, bank managers 
actually foresaw the risks on the hori-
zon and forecasted future economic 
growth appropriately, which enabled 
them to make optimal investment and 
financing decisions for their equity 
shareholders, based on their franchise 
value.
As we will outline in this Issue 
Brief, policymakers failed to appreci-
ate the role that franchise value plays 
in the decisions of banks. They conse-
quently did not anticipate that banks, 
in general, actually would hoard 
reserves (instead of extending credit) 
in response to the extraordinary 
measures undertaken by governments 
and central banks after the start of the 
financial crisis. There is an important 
lesson that should be learned here: if 
policymakers wish to devise appro-
priate fiscal or monetary policies to 
prevent or mitigate a future crisis, they 
need to properly account for the con-
straints under which bank managers 
operate and how franchise value drives 
their decision-making.
FRANCHISE VALUE: WHY 
BANKS SHIFT THEIR RISKS
During economic expansions, 
bank franchise value is generally 
large and banks protect it by avoid-
ing excessive risks that may lead to 
early bankruptcy. Over time, however, 
aggregate risks eventually build, and 
franchise values begin to fall as risk 
premia rise (see Figure 1). It is at this 
point that risk-taking throughout the 
banking sector begins to accelerate.
For a brief glimpse into what 
this looks like in practice, consider 
the following facts regarding banks’ 
responses to macroeconomic condi-
tions in the 2003–2008 period:
  1 See Borio and Lowe (2002); Reinhart and Rogoff (2009); 
Jord`a, Schularick, and Taylor (2011); Schularick and 
Taylor (2012); Mian and Sufi (2009); Mian, Sufi, and Verner 
(2017); Krishnamurthy and Muir (2016).
  2 Work by Minsky (1977) and Kindleberger (1978) already 
emphasizes the potential for over-optimism to destabilize 
the economy. Behavioral explanations include neglected 
risks (Gennaioli, Shleifer, and Vishny, 2012) and extrapola-
tive beliefs (Barberis, Shleifer, and Vishny, 1998; Green-
wood and Hanson, 2013). 
  3 The primary source for this Issue Brief is Gomes, Grotteria, 
& Wachter (2019), “Foreseen Risks.” All references in this 
brief can be found in that source.
  4 Hirtle (2016).
  5 This maximum leverage position is defined by the need to 
pay a fine proportional to deposits when leverage exceeds 
this value. Generally, even a small cost will be enough to 
ensure that banks comply with the regulatory constraint.
  6 Duchin and Sosyura (2014); Bassett, Demiralp, and Lloyd 
(2017).
  7 Carpinelli and Crosignani (2018).
  8 Di Maggio, Kermani, and Palmer (2016).
  9 Rodnyansky and Darmouni (2017).
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FIGURE 1: RELATIONSHIP BETWEEN FRANCHISE VALUE AND THE LIKELIHOOD OF DEFAULT
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• Bank leverage, while relatively 
low in the early 2000s, increased 
steadily from 2004, and then grew 
exponentially from 2006 until the 
onset of the crisis (see Figure 2).
• Banks held fewer and fewer 
safe assets (e.g., Treasuries and cash) 
on their balance sheets until the third 
quarter of 2008 (see Figure 3). 
• Large bank holding companies 
were implementing extensive stock 
repurchases in the lead-up to the crisis 
to bolster their own share prices.4 
• Bank dividend payouts 
remained high before and during the 
crisis, benefiting equity holders at the 
potential future expense of banks’ debt 
holders.
These facts suggest a picture of 
increased risk-taking and pessimism 
about the future that accelerated 
before September 2008. This is not 
surprising. As the probability of a 
crisis rises above certain thresh-
olds, a bank’s incentives change in 
a dramatic way. The probability of a 
shutdown can increase to the point 
where avoiding it entirely becomes 
too costly. In that case, a bank shifts 
from being a “good bank,” making 
safe investments and seeking to stay 
in business, to being a “bad bank,” in 
effect taking advantage of the subsidy 
offered to depositors by becoming 
over-leveraged. For a bank with low 
leverage, the shift does not occur until 
the probability of a crisis is as high 
as 5%. For a bank with the middle 
value (in our sample), it occurs at 2%. 
For a bank with the highest leverage, 
even the smallest probabilities of crisis 
compel it to maintain assets at their 
lowest value.5 
We can see the same mechanisms 
at work in the optimal portfolio allo-
cation of a bank. When the probabil-
ity of a crisis is low, well-capitalized 
banks avoid risky loans to households; 
however, poorly capitalized banks will 
make those loans. But at a threshold 
level, the loan portfolio shifts toward 
over-weighting the risky household 
loans. This shift occurs at the same 
point at which the bank decides to 
hold less equity. 
What explains the shift from 
“good bank” to “bad bank” when the 
likelihood of an impending crisis 
rises? In a word, franchise value, 
which decreases as the crisis probabil-
ity increases. When a bank becomes 
over-leveraged and invests in risky 
household loans, it is effectively “gam-
bling for resurrection.” If the gamble 
pays off, a bank can generate high 
returns for its equity holders. If the 
gamble leads to a bad outcome, a bank 
could be shut down, either by regula-
tors or by bankruptcy. Of course, if a 
shutdown is foreseen as likely regard-
less, equity holders cannot be further 
penalized, so they may find it prefer-
able to exploit the additional reward 
from gambling on risky assets. In the 
data that we have from 2003-2008, 
that is precisely what we see.
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FIGURE 2: MARKET LEVERAGE OF BANK HOLDING COMPANIES, 1992-2016
FIGURE 3: RELATIVE SIZE OF SAFE ASSETS IN BANK PORTFOLIOS, 1992-2019
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POLICY LESSONS 
After the 2008 financial crisis, 
executive branches and central banks 
in advanced economies responded 
by providing the banking sector with 
additional guarantees on funding. 
These included the Capital Purchase 
Program (CPP) and the first round of 
quantitative easing measures (QE1) in 
the United States, and the long-term 
refinancing operations (LTRO) in 
Europe. The dominant policy rhetoric 
was that poor bank balance sheets lay 
behind the sharp reduction in credit. 
Although policymakers intended for 
banks to increase their lending to the 
private sector, in many cases this did 
not happen. In the U.S., institutions 
that were included in the Capital Pur-
chase Program did not increase their 
loans.6  Similarly, other researchers 
conclude that LTROs in Europe were 
equally ineffective in boosting bank 
lending.7
This behavior need not be puz-
zling. As our model suggests, we 
can understand these interventions 
through their impact on bank fran-
chise value. Several of these policies 
worked to provide banks with funding 
at very favorable terms, in effect sub-
sidizing the banking sector (CPP and 
LTROs were explicitly designed to do 
just that) and increasing the franchise 
value of banks. These policies suc-
ceeded chiefly in reinforcing banks’ 
incentives to hold more safe assets.
A consequence of interventions 
like QE1 was that banks could rely 
on (relatively) more equity. This was 
because with increased franchise val-
ues, default would trigger larger losses 
for equity holders. As a result, this 
policy intervention produced a decline 
in expected bank failure rates. 
However, the increased conserva-
tism by equity holders also manifested 
itself in the optimal portfolio compo-
sition of banks. In general, the optimal 
asset composition subsequently tilted 
more towards government bonds and 
away from risky private loans. Only 
poorly capitalized banks eschewed 
this behavior to remain fully invested 
in private sector loans. Thus, poli-
cies that effectively subsidized bank 
equity holders by allowing them tap 
debt markets at below-market rates 
led many banks to reduce overall risk 
taking. In the U.S., some researchers 
describe a “flypaper effect” in which 
banks chose to hold excess reserves 
with the central bank rather than 
expand credit to the private sector.8  
This effect is particularly strong when 
the likelihood of a crisis was high. 
These findings add a fresh per-
spective to the ongoing debate about 
the effects of unconventional mon-
etary policies on bank lending. In 
particular, they suggest an explanation 
for the perceived limited success of 
unconventional monetary policies in 
stimulating bank credit to the private 
sector during the economic recovery 
after the recent financial crisis. Our 
results are also consistent with other 
evidence, which finds that U.S. banks 
with mortgage-backed securities on 
their books increased lending rela-
tive to their peers after QE1.9  These 
banks, gambling for resurrection, 
remained the most eager to replace 
safe assets with risky ones. 
CONCLUSIONS 
While it may be plausible that 
households, perhaps based on lack of 
experience, over-optimism, or simply 
rule-of-thumb behavior, took more 
risk than, ex post, proved optimal in 
the run-up to the 2008 crisis, it is 
harder to believe that banks, en masse, 
decided to lend to such households 
purely based on over-optimism, as 
observable economic conditions 
worsened. 
Our study suggests that reap-
plying recent policies toward banks 
in a future crisis might have effects 
counter to what is intended. A bank’s 
decisions over time are driven by 
fluctuations in its franchise value. 
Methods to strengthen banks, while 
conferring some long-run benefits, 
might actually result in less lending if 
they increase this franchise value. On 
the flip side, any policy with the side 
effect of weakening banks might actu-
ally result in more undesirable lend-
ing, and further bank instability, as 
banks gamble for resurrection. In both 
cases, ignoring the incentive effects of 
policy on banks could itself exacerbate 
underlying risks. 
publicpolicy.wharton.upenn.edu
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